Factors of Stability and Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean Pacific and the Pacific

by Angelos Syrigos


Political and Geographical Differences Between the two Regions


There are some very important differences between the Pacific and the Eastern Mediterranean. First, the Pacific is
bordered by the three countries with the largest military forces of the world, and by a fourth state which occupies a
leading role in world commerce. On the contrary, the coastal states of the Eastern Mediterranean have comparatively
limited capacities both in military power and commerce. Another important difference lies in the field of culture.
Whereas the eastern and western coasts of the Pacific are divided by sharp cultural distinctions, the people in the
Eastern Mediterranean lived for long periods within the same empires and they learned to a certain extent how to
tolerate their cultural differences.
Beyond these political considerations the most striking feature in any comparison between the two areas is their
geographical extent. The Pacific constitutes the world's largest ocean while the Eastern Mediterranean has limited
maritime spaces bounded on three sides by land. This difference has as a consequence that the exits of the Eastern
Mediterranean, play a significant role in comparison with the Pacific. Thus, two important international straits exist in
the Eastern Mediterranean via the Dardanelles into the Black Sea and via the Suez Canal into the Red Sea. The only
narrow passage which constitutes an exit for the Pacific Ocean is northwards via the Bering Strait. 1 However only a
small amount of traffic would normally pass from the Pacific to the Arctic Ocean. Moreover, the extent of the maritime
spaces is directly relevant to the claims of the riparian states in relation to maritime zones. Thus, it is interesting to note
that all countries in the Pacific claim 200 nautical miles as a fishing or exclusive zone or have foreshadowed such a
claim. 2 On the contrary and due to the limited maritime spaces in the eastern Mediterranean, the countries of the area
are very reluctant to claim such extended maritime zones.
Compared with fifteen insular States in the Pacific there is only one island state in the Eastern Mediterranean. The vast
areas of the Pacific are scattered with numerous island groups. Ιn spite of the existence of several seamounts in the
Eastern Mediterranean, only a few are capped with islands. Thus, almost all the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean are
in the Aegean Sea with the exception of the island of Cyprus. There exist also a few islands along the western coasts of
the Ionian and the Adriatic sea. This specific reference to the islands is made because islands per se have proven to be
the "most troublesome natural features…to cloud the maritime limits field…-islands as basepoints, islands as maritime
boundaries, islands as atolls, islands as archipelagos". 3
Island Disputes in the Pacific and the Eastern Mediterranean
It is hardly surprising that disputes currently exist all over the world between states as to the use of islands. The two
regions under examination here are not exceptions to the rule. However even in that point there is an important
difference between the Pacific and the Eastern Mediterranean. Most of the island groups in the Pacific are from a
geographical point of view sufficiently distinct to make unnecessary any formal definitions of national territory. In
addition to this factor the colonial powers which operated in the region during the last two centuries divided the islands
among them in fairly compact distinct groups. 4 The states which gained their independence after the end of colonialism
followed in general the divisions already established by the colonial powers.
In the case of the two island disputes in the South China Sea, namely the Paracel/Hsisha and the Spartly/Nansha
archipelagos, the islands are in areas which are thought to contain oil and gas deposits 5 or known to have large fish
stocks. The apple of discord in the disputes between States in the Pacific is mainly connected with the extended
maritime zones which can be established around islands and not with sovereignty over the terra firma per se. The claims
over the islands in the Pacific are due to the fact that there exists conflicting historical evidence as to their sovereignty
which is comparatively recent. 6 For example, the earlier historical evidence to the Paracel/Hsisha invoked by Vietnam
dates from 1801. 7 Sovereignty over the islands is used as a medium to claim the maritime zones which can be
established around islands. It is interesting to note that all countries in the Pacific claim 200 nautical miles as a fishing
or exclusive zone or have foreshadowed such a claim. 8 The extent of the application of the rules of the new law of the
Sea is of primary importance for the States in the Pacific which follow closely all the developments in this field.
Clearly, this is not the case in the Eastern Mediterranean. The only dispute concerning islands in this area is between
Greece and Turkey. Although Turkey participated in the Third UNCLOS, it did not sign the final document of the
Conference which was ratified on 16th November 1994. 9 The claims over the Aegean islands are not connected with
the exploitation of any potential oil resources or any large fish stocks. Moreover, it has to be emphasized that the
Aegean Sea has attracted the interest of geographers and cartographers for more than 2.000 years. The Aegean in no
way resembles the size of the South China Sea or of the Pacific Ocean. Thus it would be hardly surprising to say that
there exist in the Aegean terrae nulius which waited until the end of the 20th century for someone to discover, occupy
and acquire sovereignty over them.
Nevertheless, in January 1996 the Turkish Government officially laid claims over two uninhabited rocks in the southern
Aegean Sea which are known to the Greeks as Imia and to the Turks as Kardak. The islets lie at a distance of 3.7 miles
from the Turkish mainland coasts and two miles from another Greek island, Kalolimnos. The January 1996 incident is a
landmark in the recent legal and diplomatic history of the two countries. In the years between 1973-1995 the disputes
between the two countries involved problems which concerned undelimited zones like the continental shelf, air-traffic
control and rescue zone settlements and the possibility of extending of the Greek territorial waters to twelve miles. The
dispute over the Greek national airspace, the only dispute which was related directly with a part of Greek sovereignty is
a case where both countries can present valid arguments based on international law.
The Stability of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty
The Imia/Kardak incident is the first occasion that Turkey laid claims on Greek territory since the beginning of the 20th
century. In 1922 and following the defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia the Allied powers decided to negotiate a fresh
territorial settlement of the region at Lausanne three years after the Treaty of Sevres. During the Lausanne Conference
Greece and Turkey were left to arrive at a mutually acceptable boundary settlement which lead to the adoption of the
Lausanne Treaty. All the Aegean islands, which were predominantly inhabited by Greeks, were placed under the
sovereignty of Greece. Nevertheless, there were two exceptions. Due to their position off the entrance of Dardanelles,
the islands of Imbros and Tenedos were returned to Turkey despite the fact that they contained only a small Turkish
minority and that they had been under Greek control for over a decade. The second exception were the Dodecanese
islands. Turkey by Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty, renounced in favour of Italy all rights and title over the
Dodecanese Islands including Castellorizo.
The Lausanne settlement provided the basis for peace in the region. The territorial settlement was followed by a
compulsory exchange of the Greek and Turkish minorities (189,916 Greeks and 355,635 Turks) 10 between the two
countries. To these numbers should be added another 1,300,000 Greeks who fled Asia Minor prior to the constitution of
the Lausanne Commission. 11 Though a tragic experience for the individuals concerned, 12 this mass exodus resulted in
a much smaller minority presence in both countries and led to the adoption of a different approach to the problem of
protecting their human rights.
Greece acquired an ethnic homogeneity and restored the unity of Hellenism within a unified state. This constituted a
historical fact of great significance. The end of the dispersion of Hellenism between two continents and the general
coincidence between the ethnological and territorial limits of the Greek people, brought an end to the policy of the
Megali Idea (Great Idea) which aimed to the independence and unification of all the Greeks with the ultimate aim the
re-establishment of the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire. 13 The Greek minorities in Constantinople and Northern
Epirus, Albania, had rights which were, theoretically at least, protected by international treaties. The last substantial
areas of Greek population, Cyprus and the Dodecanese islands, which remained outside the boundaries of the Greek
state were not under Turkish control and this was not felt to be a potential source of difficulty. Thus, the major objective
of Greek foreign policy became the security of the state rather than the liberation of those parts of the nation outside of
Greek territory.
Simultaneously, Turkey, "by appreciating that it would be unavailing to insist on some of her claims in Thrace and the
Aegean Islands ... won a treaty that yielded positive results and established the basis for a stable peace between herself
and the signatory powers". 14 As it was observed:
"With Turkey retaining only the three islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles, one sees how comprehensively 'Greek'
was the Aegean conceived to be in the territorial settlement in the Treaty of Lausanne. It was as if the Turkish boundary
was to be the coast of the mainland (save for those three islands) and, territorially, the Aegean was to be Greek". 15
It is not known if the signatories to the Lausanne Treaty expected it to last for so long. What is important to note is that
this Treaty inaugurated the more lasting settlement between countries - in this case, between Greece and Turkey than
any other treaty which followed the First World War.
Factors of Instability in Greek-Turkish Relations
The Lausanne settlement lasted undisputed for 73 years. This does not mean that during all these years the relations
between the two States were peaceful. The years between 1930 and 1950 can be considered as the best period in the
mutual relations of the two countries. The reason might be the fact that both Greece and Turkey "shared the same
perceptions of external threat", 16 namely Italy, before the Second World War, and the Soviet Union and its allies after
it.
After the end of World War II, the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in 1945 recognized in principle that the
Dodecanese Islands should be awarded to Greece. 17 They were finally ceded to the Greek State according to the terms
of the Treaty of Paris (1947) which was signed between Italy and the Allies, including Greece, and which disposed of
Italy's overseas possessions. Turkey did not raise any objections to this Treaty, although it has been argued recently that
Turkey "agreed" to the transfer of these islands as a token to Greece for its participation in the post-war Western
Alliance. The reality is that Turkey (the evasive neutral), because of its neutrality during World War II, was in no
position to obstruct the transfer of these islands to Greece, even if she had wished to do so. 18
At the height of the Cold War in 1952, Greece and Turkey were admitted to the NATO Alliance, but this did not end the
hostility between the two nations. A new thorn in Greek-Turkish relations developed: the Cyprus problem. Although in
the late 1950's Greece and Turkey tried to improve their relations, and despite the proclamation of the independence of
Cyprus in 1960, the internal stress and conflicts in this island between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority
caused a major crisis in Greek-Turkish relations. The demand of the ethnic Greek majority in Cyprus for union with
Greece was considered by Turkey as a re-awakening of the "Great Idea" policy among the Greeks. 19 In the 60's
fighting between the two communities of the island, threats of invasion and Turkish air raids, infiltration by units of the
Greek army, American plans for union of Cyprus with Greece in return for the creation of Turkish military bases and
the dispatch of a United Nations peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) were serious events which had a profound effect on
the relations and public opinion of the two countries. 20
On the other hand, the destructive riots damaging Greek properties in Istanbul in September 1955, organized by the
Turkish police, marked the beginning of the end of the once flourishing Greek community which was left there in
accordance with the Lausanne treaty. A dramatic decline in its numbers took place in the months and years after these
incidents. Matters of security were also raised. Turkey accused Greece of upsetting the status quo by militarizing the
eastern Aegean islands.
Since 1973 an almost permanent state of tension has existed between the two countries. In addition to Cyprus, another
"apple of discord" between Greece and Turkey has proved to be the Aegean Sea and especially the potentially oil-rich
continental shelf. In 1973 commercially significant deposits were discovered off the island of Thassos by Oceanic
Exploration of Denver, Colorado. 22 The oil and gas fields in the Thassos area are the only commercially exploitable
fields that have been discovered after nearly eighteen years of exploration in the Aegean. Nevertheless since the
discovery of the Prinos field, relations between the two countries have sometimes reached a level so low that even
armed conflict has seemed possible.
Both countries are almost entirely dependent on oil imports. During the period of the first Arab oil embargo and the
subsequent energy crisis, with oil prices rapidly rising, any resources in the continental shelf looked attractive.
Furthermore in 1974 there existed a certain confusion in public international law and two different versions of the law
of maritime delimitation: the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and the North Sea cases judgment.
Although Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 had established equidistance as a flexible method of delimitation,
which would allow a given solution to take into account the particular facts of each case, 23 it was not accepted as a
rule of general or customary international law by the ICJ in the North Sea cases. 24 The Court's decision that the
application of the 1958 provision on the delimitation of the continental shelf should be based only on treaty
relationships, provided the perfect backdrop for the development of the dispute. Greece had become a party to the
Continental Shelf Convention in 1972. Turkey was not and is not a party to it. 25
The seed of discord between Greece and Turkey might be the lack of energy resources. But behind this consideration
lies the fact that the limited, functional character of sovereignty over the continental shelf today can be transformed into
full sovereignty in the future. And this was more apparent in a case like the Aegean where the two countries speak not
only for their economic interests but often associate the continental shelf regime with their security and sovereignty.
Until 1973 the legal status of the Aegean Sea was never questioned by Turkey. The award of exploration and
exploitation rights in 27 maritime areas of the Aegean to the state owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in
1973, without prior consultation with the Greek Government, was considered by Greece as amounting to a unilateral
delimitation of the continental shelf. 26 The map accompanying the announcement was seen as delimiting the seabed
between Greece and Turkey by means of a median line equidistant from the Greek and Turkish mainland which
extended southwards and to the west of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean with no regard being paid to these
islands. Moreover, some of the exploration areas lay just beyond the territorial waters of the large and populated Greek
islands of Lesbos, Chios, Lemnos and Samothrace.
The events that took place in Cyprus in July 1974 temporarily supplanted the Aegean dispute. On 15 July, 1974, the
military junta that had ruled Greece since 1967 attempted to overthrow the government of Cyprus by coup d' etat. This
gave Turkey the opportunity to invade Cyprus five days later. On the very day that Turkish troops boarded their landing
boats Cyprus-bound, Turkey granted more exploration licenses in the Aegean, extending further west and south to
include the continental shelf around the Dodecanese islands. 27
In the wake of the Cyprus crisis a new political environment emerged in which the Aegean became the potential
flashpoint. Greece started to fortify the eastern Aegean islands 28 while Turkey occupied nearly 40% of Cyprus. The
restoration of democracy and the creation of a civilian government in July 1974 did not change the situation. Until the
end of 1974 diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, designed to narrow the dispute over the continental shelf,
tended to emphasise the disagreement rather than solve the problem. 29
Between 1974 and 1987 the Turkish diplomatic tactic was to raise additional matters in order to achieve a desired
"trade-off" in the continental shelf delimitation. By raising issues like the control over the Athens FIR, Turkey wanted
to collect bargaining pieces in relation to its main dispute with Greece. The gambit was to raise a dispute in one section
as a means of getting satisfaction in another: but despite the various problematic issues that were raised the emphasis
was always placed on the Aegean continental shelf problem. 30
After the March 1987 crisis which brought the two countries to the brink of a war this tactic was followed only once in
relation to the maritime search and rescue area in the Aegean. 31 The main characteristic of this period was that
particular emphasis was placed on the Muslim minority of Western Thrace as well as on the demilitarization of the
Eastern Aegean islands. 32 This change of policy was followed by successful attempts to persuade the Muslim minority
to support and elect for the first time in the Greek parliament independent Muslim candidates who were not members of
any political party. The aim of Turkish foreign policy was to raise many individual issues, irrelevant to the continental
shelf, which taken together could form a package of problems solvable only by a package deal approach. It seemed that
buried in the legal problems of the delimitation of the continental shelf, of the extent of the Greek territorial waters and
of the Aegean airspace and of the limits of the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) were the original claims of
contest of the Lausanne territorial settlement.
Greece on the other hand did not raise new problems. Generally the Greek approach was more defensive in comparison
with the Turkish one for one simple reason. The existing status quo was not felt so unsatisfactory to Athens as to
Ankara and Greece wanted to maintain it. The aim of the Greek government between 1981 and 1986 to connect
progress in Greek-Turkish bilateral problems with a solution to the Cyprus problem had failed. Moreover, the
paramount importance given to this later problem in the Greek foreign affairs hierarchy affected continuously the
decisions of the subsequent Greek governments.
Threats of War
Throughout this period numerous statements were made by Turkish leaders which caused Greece to fear an attack. In
these statements Turkish politicians questioned the Greek nature of the Aegean islands and often claimed that the Greek
islands of the Aegean close to the Turkish coastline were part of Anatolia where Turkish rule should be restored.
Characteristic of these statements was that made by the Minister of Defence of Turkey, Sancar, in which he said that the
balance of power in the Aegean was in Turkey's favour to such an extent that "the eyes and thoughts of the old Turkish
inhabitants of the islands remain set on resettlement of the opposite coasts, which lie only a few miles apart". 33
The most important of these threats of war was made on the 9 June 1995, some days after the ratification of the Law of
the Sea Convention by the Greek parliament. On that day the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved rather
unexpectedly a resolution which empowered the Turkish government to take all measures including military ones if
Greece extended its territorial waters beyond the current six miles. As it was stated "the Turkish Grand National
Assembly has decided to grant the Turkish government all powers, including those that may be deemed necessary in the
military field, for safeguarding and defending the vital interests of Turkey" in the case of an extension of the Greek
territorial sea to 12 miles, making use of the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention. 34
The resolution was signed by the representatives of all Turkish political parties. In Greece, the Turkish resolution was
described as threatening peace and stability in the greater region since "the enforcement and implementation of
international conventions has become a pretext for the reiteration of brutal and historically constant threats against
Greece." 35 According to a letter addressed to the U.N. secretary general by Greece's permanent representative at the
U.N., the Turkish resolution was described as constituting "a direct violation of Article 2, para. 4 of the Charter of the
UN" which stipulates that all the UN members refrain from the threat or use of force, and as confirming Turkish claims
against the Greek islands. The Greek government attached particular importance to the fact that the Turkish threat,
"intended to prevent the commitment of an illegal act but, on the contrary, to prevent the implementation of rules and
rights deriving from international law". 36
In substance, the Turkish resolution falls undoubtedly under the provisions of Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which
states:
All members [of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
The "comprehensiveness of these provisions can hardly be surpassed." 37 Article 2.4 outlaws not only recourse to war
but any use or threat of force that is against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. 38 The
expression "including those [powers] that may be deemed necessary in the military field" which was embodied in the
Turkish resolution can only be understood as purely military or armed force, which falls totally under the meaning of
Article 2.4 of the UN Charter. What is equally important is that its threat to use force was not made for promoting
justice but, on the contrary, for stopping another state from exercising its legitimate rights. The threat of a war was an
answer to the exercise of a right which is in total conformity with international law. That was the reason Turkey
invoked the use of force since it did not have any lawful means to stop the exercise of a legitimate right. In concluding
the evaluation of the legitimacy of the Turkish resolution it is very difficult not to examine international practice
concerning this field. Thus, as has been rightly observed:
No Baltic State has ever thought to create an international dispute out of the fact that shipping has to pass
through Danish, Swedish or German waters before reaching out to the North Sea. Gulf shipping is equally
obliged to visit Iranian or Omani territorial waters within the Hormuz strait, yet no Gulf state ever
contested on this ground the sovereign right of either Iran or Oman to increase their territorial sea to
twelve miles and close the high seas corridor which would otherwise have existed through the strait. 39
The "Grey" Zones of the Aegean
Before 1996 the status of the islands was questioned officially only in relation to the maritime zones and especially the
continental shelf. Turkey challenged the right of the islands to possess their own continental shelf platforms
independently of any continental land. Therefore it asked for an "equitable" treatment between the two states in the
Aegean where the delimitation of the continental shelf was to take into account the opposite continental coasts and
ignore the presence of islands. The geographical context of the Aegean does not offer the perfect background for an
equal/reasonable treatment of both countries. Thousands of islands are scattered all over the place, which in their
totality belong only to one of the two riparian states, Greece. If equity is understood as an independent principle, which
does not have to be applied only when the result of the rule of law leads to an inequity, then it could be used to correct
the inequities of nature or political history. This is the way that it was interpreted by Turkey. On the other hand, the
Greeks preferred to insist upon the general rule of law without examining the possible existence of some abnormal or
exceptional situations.
Nevertheless, the difference concerning the right of the Aegean islands to maritime zones or their extent was
overshadowed by the Imia incident where Turkey contested Greek sovereignty over numerous islets and rocks in the
Aegean. In December 1995 a Turkish ship ran aground on Imia, one of two uninhabited islets, which belong to the
Dodecanese islands group. After the salvage operations the Turkish Foreign Ministry claimed that "the islets of Kardak
(Imia) constitute part of the Turkish territory and that they had been recently registered in the Registry of Deeds of the
Turkish province of Mulga". 40 When the incident leaked to the press in late January 1996 the tension escalated rapidly
and the two countries put its armed forces on full alert. The whole incident was brought to a peaceful end on the 31
January after US mediation. At the same time the Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Omer Akbel was saying that
"the issue was not merely the ownership of Kardak rocks (Imia) …there are hundreds of little islands, islets and rocks in
the Aegean and their status remains unclear". This was "due to the absence of a comprehensive bilateral agreement
between the two countries". 41 According to Akbel, Turkey had started a legal study on the status of these insular
formations.
By the end of May 1996 low-level contacts between Greek and Turkish diplomats in Geneva reconfirmed Ankara's
view of the existence of "grey areas" of sovereignty in the Aegean. The Turkish diplomats however, refused to name
these areas. 42 Finally, in the middle of June 1996 the Turkish daily Milliyet presented the Turkish position concerning
areas in the Aegean over which Ankara disputes Greek sovereignty. According to an article in the daily, besides the
sovereignty of the larger inhabited Aegean islands, where Greek sovereignty is based on bilateral and international
agreements, there exist other islands, islets and rocks that "Greece considers its territory" without being supported by
any agreement. Milliyet stated that the islets are a type of "no man's land" but that Ankara had decided for that moment
not to bring the matter up for discussion, before recourse was made for some type of "arbitration". It is interesting to
note that among these islets also included was the island of Agathonisi with a population of 112 people. 43
Two months later the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet revealed the existence of a Turkish military report which stated that
"the Aegean islands not referred to in any treaty, and which were not taken by Greece during the Balkan
wars, as well as the islands, islets and rocks lying less than 6 miles from the Turkish coast legally
belong to Turkey, the state which succeeded the Ottoman Empire. …Turkey retains its sovereignty over
these islands, apart from those given to Greece under Article 12 of the Treaty of Lausanne" 44
International Treaties and Stability
The 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty is rightly considered as the cornerstone of the legal status quo in the Aegean. It was a
treaty between several states including the ceding and the cessionary state. 45 What is in dispute between Greece and
Turkey is the extent of this cession. If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a territory, "it is customary to examine
which of the States claiming sovereignty possesses a title -cession, conquest, occupation etc.- superior to that which the
other State might possibly bring forward against it". 46 Therefore, the legal title of the two parties over the islands of
the Aegean has to be examined. The northern and eastern Aegean islands and the Dodecanese group belonged before
1912 to the Ottoman Empire. During the first Balkan War the Aegean islands with the exception of the Dodecanese
group were occupied by the Greek navy. The Dodecanese islands passed under Italian occupation with the exception of
the island of Kastelorizo which was self-governed for one year, in 1914 became a naval base for the French navy and in
1920 was offered to the Italians.
Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty provided that the Aegean islands were placed under the sovereignty of Greece with
the exception of the Dodecanese group of islands, which was placed according to Article 15 under the sovereignty of
Italy. The islands of Article 12 were collectively named as the "islands of the Eastern Mediterranean" other than the
islands of Imvros, Tenedos and the Rabbit Islands. These were specified "particularly" as the islands of Lemnos,
Samothrace, Mytilene (Lesvos), Chios, Samos and Ikaria, "subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the
islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of Article 15". The Turkish argument is that there
is no mention of islets and rocks in relation to the islands placed under the Greek sovereignty.
However, it is expressly stated that Article 12 confirmed the Greek cession on the decision taken "on 13 February,
1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of 17-30 May, 1913, and 15 of the
Treaty of Athens of 1-14 November, 1913" which was communicated to the Greek government on the 13 February,
1914. The February 1914 Decision is a critical document which has to be examined carefully. Despite the Turkish claim
that the February 1914 decision named "one by one, the islands whose sovereignty is thereby transferred to Greece", 47
there was no reference to any names of islands in that Decision. On the contrary, according to the 1914 Decision the six
Powers decided to transfer to Greece "toutes les iles de la mer Egee actuellement occupees par elle, a l' exception de
Tenedos, d' Imbros et de Kastelorizo"[all the islands of the Aegean Sea actually occupied by her, with the exception of
Tenedos, Imbros and Kastelorizo]. 48 Therefore, the decision on which the cession of the islands to Greece is based,
according to the Lausanne Treaty, speaks generally of all the Aegean islands occupied by the Greek army. Moreover,
the term "islands" by that time, as well as today, includes all the insular formations irrelevant of their size. The Greek
occupation covered the whole area of the central and northern Aegean as a geographical unity over which Greek control
was indisputable. Therefore, the Greek sovereignty covers all the islands, islets and rocks apart from the exceptions
specifically mentioned in Article 12.
As it concerns the Dodecanese group of islands, Turkey renounced in favor of Italy under Article 15 of the Lausanne
Treaty all rights and title to several specifically- named islands which belong to the Dodecanese group to "the islets
dependent thereon" as well as over the island of Kastelorizo. The transfer of sovereignty over the Dodecanese islands
by Turkey to Italy constitutes the typical example of the cession of territory by the owner State to another state within
the framework of a peace treaty. 49 Especially in the case of the Dodecanese islands the transfer of sovereignty can be
more properly classified as a renunciation because the grantee state was already in occupation of the above mentioned
territories. 50
Unlike Article 12, which also speaks about territories detached from Turkey, Article 15 referred to islets dependent
from the islands specifically mentioned one by one. The reason that unlike Article 12, Article 15 uses the term "islets"
because the earlier Article confirmed an older decision which transferred territories whereas the later Article constituted
per se the basis of the title for the territorial cession of the Dodecanese islands. These islands, although they were
detached from Turkey in 1912, 51 were not officially ceded to Italy until 1923. Since the Treaty of Lausanne conferred
the title to the new territories acquired by Italy, it had to be more detailed in comparison with Article 12 which
confirmed an already existing legal situation.
Also special consideration has to be given to the elements of geography. More specifically the area of the Dodecanese
islands, in spite of its name which means twelve islands, is comprised of a total number of 1,120 insular formations.
Among these there were 31 inhabited islands in 1922, and 127 islands which have a considerable size. 52 The proximity
of the Dodecanese islands to the Anatolian coasts is more than evident since there are many islands which are embraced
by Turkish peninsulas. This geographic reality in no way resembles the case of the other Aegean islands which, with the
exception of the island of Samos, were neither in such a close proximity with the Turkish coasts to create problems in
the identification of the smaller islands adjacent to them, nor the number of their islets was so great. Therefore, the use
of the term dependent islets was preferred in order to avoid confusion as to the extent of the title over the territories
ceded to Italy.
Moreover, the Lausanne Treaty limited Turkish sovereignty with the exception of Imbros, Tenedos and the Rabbit
islands, explicitly only over islands lying within a three-mile limit off the Turkish coast and there do not exist any
Turkish rights over islets and rocks of the Aegean other than those explicitly ascribed to the Anatolian coasts. This is
explicitly stated in the following passages of the Lausanne Treaty:
Article 12
…Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three
miles from the Asian coast remain under Turkish Sovereignty.
Article 16.
Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers
laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said
Treaty…"
The text of the Lausanne Treaty is not ambiguous. Turkey possesses only the islands which are situated within three
miles from its coasts and renounces all the rights over the other Aegean islands. The exact meaning of the word "island"
at the time that the Lausanne treaty was signed, did not make any distinction between different "types" of insular
formations.
The transfer of the Dodecanese islands to Greece was confirmed by Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Treaty which repeated
almost verbatim Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty. Greece formally succeeded Italy and inherited the legal status of the
Dodecanese islands. The case of the Dodecanese islands constitutes the typical example of a partial succession of a
State where one international person acquires a part of the territory of another international person through cession. It is
a well established rule of international law confirmed by jurisprudence 53 and conventional law 54 that res transit cum
suo onere. Thus, all rights and duties arising from treaties of the predecessor state concerning boundary lines devolve on
the successor state as well. The most important of these treaties was a Treaty signed between Italy and Turkey in 1932,
which established a boundary line along the Anatolian coasts and the Dodecanese islands.
Regional Stability and Respect of Treaties
What is important to note in connection with the existence of "grey" zones of sovereignty is that it is evident, according
to the Lausanne Treaty, that Turkey renounced all its rights over all the islands which are more than three miles from
the Anatolian coasts. Moreover, Greece exercised occupation over all the Aegean islets for years until the time that this
occupation was disputed by Turkey in 1996. Therefore, Greek sovereignty over the islets asserted by Turkey as
belonging to the "grey" areas is indisputable vis-a-vis Turkey, which does not possess any title at all. 55
What Turkey does now is to ask for a change in the legal status quo.
From the other side, Turkey invokes 56 the argument that the Aegean dispute is incapable of settlement by the
application of generally recognized rules of international law because the issue in question is the possible disruption of
the balance achieved by the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which is a political matter. 57 Nevertheless, it is more than clear
that the Greek-Turkish dispute involves legal questions. In such a case arbitration and judicial settlement have to be
employed as they are most suitable for a peaceful settlement. 58
As has been stated, "every international dispute is of a political character, if by that is meant that it is of importance to
the State in question." 59 The political character was more than apparent in a series of judgments by the PCIJ as well as
the ICJ, which, however, did not prevent these two courts from deciding upon these cases. 60 Although international
law cannot be the key to all international relations, 61 it is difficult to ignore its role in cases of disputes where the
existence of international treaties give specific and unambiguous answers to questions of territorial sovereignty.
The rules of international law exist independently of the will of each state. These rules are applied in a given case as
long as rules of international law regulating a specific dispute exist. The Turkish territorial claims over the Aegean islets
and rocks are against the Lausanne and Paris treaties as well as the Greek acts of sovereignty exercised over them for
decades. From this point of view, the Aegean Sea territorial dispute, although it involves political elements, is a legal
dispute. It may come as a surprise the fact that the total Turkish argumentation in connection with the existence of
"grey" zones of sovereignty in the Aegean Sea is almost totally unfounded in the field of international law. Some of the
Turkish arguments may sound logical. Nonetheless, the idea behind them eliminates in fact the dispute from the domain
of law and leaves the door open for instability in the Eastern Mediterranean region.